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INTRODUCTION
It is necessary and desirable for Armenia to retain close relations with Russia in
both the short and long term. However, recent concessions to Russia for good relations
in the short term may have potentially harmful repercussions for Armenia in the future.
These concessions have in part resulted in the Russian dominance in the economic
sector, overdependence on Russia for Armenia’s energy needs, and the perpetuation of
Armenian submissiveness to Russian interests. Armenia should, therefore, maintain
good relations with Russia while simultaneously securing long-term paths that focus on
actual strategic partnership and not dependence. In short, Armenia should return to a
foreign policy of complementarism, which was first enacted under the Republic of
Armenia’s first president, Levon Ter-Petrossian.
Complementarism stresses the importance of pursuing Armenia’s best interest
through the adoption of balanced policies and through minimal involvement or
identification within regional blocs. The leveraging of Armenia’s long-term interests for
close relations with Russia is possibly best exemplified in the state of Armenia’s
economy. Like many former Soviet republics, the collapse of entangled Soviet trading
patterns and the legacy of its centrally-planned economy still have negative implications
for Armenian industry and trade.

CHAPTER 1: ARMENIAN-RUSSIAN ECONOMIC RELATIONS
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1.1 Overview of the Armenian Economy
Landlocked and in possession of few natural resources, Armenia has relied
heavily on service, industrial, and agricultural-based industries. Further complicating its
economic status is the reality of its double-blockaded boarders with neighboring Turkey
and Azerbaijan. In place since 1993, the blockades have had two main effects on
Armenia’s economy. First, it has pointedly heightened Armenia’s reliance on Russia for
trade and energy. The largest crude oil pipeline in the region, the Baku-Tbilisi-Ceyhan
line, which runs from Azerbaijan to Georgia and ends in Turkey, purposefully bypasses
Armenia, excluding it from a lucrative share in the exportation of Caspian oil to Europe..
Primarily, Armenia’s source of crude oil comes from Russia, via the North CaucasusTranscaucasus pipeline and the smaller Mozdok-Tbilisi pipeline. The Tabriz-Yersakh
natural gas pipeline, which runs between Iran and southern Armenia, had the potential
to supply almost twice the amount of Armenia’s yearly natural gas consumption and
showed great promise in decreasing Armenia’s energy dependence on Russia.
However, this dependence was not realized due to concessions by the Armenian
government in exchange for the continuation of subsidized prices for Russian oil.1
Because of the Armenian submissiveness that lead to these concessions, Russia now
holds the majority stake in the Tabriz-Yersakh pipeline as well, crushing Armenian
hopes to curtail dependence on Russia for Armenia’s energy needs.
Secondly, the blockades have increased transportation costs of Armenian goods.
Excluding Turkey and Azerbaijan, Armenia shares its wide, mountainous, northern
1

Socor, Vladimir. “Armenia’s Giveaways to Russia: From Property-For-Debt to Property-For-Gas.” Eurasia Daily
Monitor. Volume: 3. Issue: 76. 19 April. 2006. Web. 09 Nov. 2010.
http://www.jamestown.org/single/?no_cache=1&tx_ttnews[tt_news]=31599
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border with Georgia and a small but strategic 20 mile border with Iran in the south.
Armenia’s primary export partners are Germany, Russia, and Ireland, and this
necessitates the transit of Armenian goods through relatively underdeveloped land
routes in Georgia until the goods reach the Black Sea ports of Batumi and Poti, from
where they will be shipped to Europe. Because Armenia’s transportation options are
severely limited, premiums on shipping costs usually reach 35 percent more than
competitively-driven shipping costs.2 The Armenian government estimates that the
perpetuation of the blockade costs Armenian businesses hundreds of millions of dollars
per year in increased transportation fees.3 This places undue financial burdens on
existing Armenian businesses and industry while discouraging investors from growing
existing businesses and starting new ones, which further contributes to the plight of the
Armenian economy.
Although main sectors of its economy also include mining, agriculture, and the
manufacturing of machine parts, Armenia’s economy is largely service-based, revolving
heavily around construction and tourism industries. While these sectors enjoyed
promising growth as Armenia experienced double-digit percentage increases in GDP
from 2004 through 2008, they proved to be highly volatile to the sway of international
markets and experienced serious financial and human capital losses as a result of the
global economic crisis. The construction sector, which relies heavily on Russian
investment, witnessed a sharp reduction in investment in 2009 and 2010, resulting in
the loss of several thousands of jobs, further exacerbating socioeconomic tensions.

2

"Cargo Transportation to Georgian Poti Costs $1200, to U.S. - 800." News.Am: The Shortest Way to Know. 1 Nov.
2010. Web. 29 Nov. 2010. <http://news.am/eng/news/36579.>.
3
Ibid.
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Optimistic government forecasts predict that GDP growth in 2011 will exceed 4.6
percent; however, given the expected 15 percent decrease in GDP in 2010, Armenia is
unlikely to see broad, impacting results as a result of this growth.4 Meanwhile, Russia’s
GDP is expected to fall 8% in 2010; the fact that an 8% drop in Russian GDP causes a
15% drop in Armenian GDP starkly denotes Armenia’s economic dependence on
Russia.5 Regardless of the predicted growth in GDP in 2011 for both nations, GDP
increases during the 2000s only made marginal improvements in the overall quality of
life for Armenians. GDP growth in the 2010s is expected to have a similarly feeble effect
on the average Armenian.6
The paradox of almost a decade of double-digit GDP growth having little effect
on the population at large can be explained by Armenia’s commodity-based
monopolies, which are run by a set of oligarchs who resemble less powerful versions of
the Russian oligarchs of the 1990s. Projections estimate that over 55 percent of the
GDP is controlled by just 44 families.7 This figure sheds light on the reality of Armenian
economic growth: only the top 8 percent of Armenians reaped the benefits of increases
in GDP in the 2000s.8 As construction investments halt, as industrial plants temporarily
freeze production until demand increases, and as farmers worry about self-sustainment
during the winter as a result of widespread damages to crops due to unseasonable
44

“Tigran Sargsyan: GDP growth to make 4.6% in Armenia in 2011.” PanArmenian.net. 18 Oct. 2010. Web. 09 Nov.
2010. http://www.panarmenian.net/eng/economy/news/55418/.
5

"Russia's GDP Decrease in 2009 to Exceed Predicted 8.5% -- Kudrin | Business." RIA Novosti. 2 Dec. 2009. Web. 29
Nov. 2010. <http://en.rian.ru/business/20091202/157073600>.
66
“Armenian GDP Drops in 2009, But No Decline in Living Standards.” Armenians.net. 01 Jan. 2010. Web. 09 Nov.
2010. http://www.armnews.com/view/article/1597/.
7
Khachatrian, Haroutiun. “Competitive Edge: The pitfalls of monopolies, and the challenges of a businessinfluenced parliament.” ArmeniaNow.com. 04 Jan. 2008. Web. 09 Nov. 2010.
http://www.armenianow.com/special_issues/agbumag/8033/competitive_edge_the_pitfalls_of_m.
8
Griffin, Kieth, Thomas Kelley, Terry McKinley, Bargat Asatryan, Levon Barkhudaryan, and Armen Yeghriazarian.
Growth, Poverty, and Inequality in Armenia. Rep. United Nations Development Programme, 2002. Print.
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weather, it is the majority of Armenians that feels the pressure of the global financial
crisis. According to the Armenian government, about one-third of Armenians live in
poverty.9 World Bank estimates put the number closer to 50 percent.10
The global financial crisis has also sharply decreased the amount of remittances
that Armenians receive from family members working abroad. Due to lack of economic
development and opportunity, approximately one-fifth of Armenians lives and works
abroad, predominantly in Russia. Remittances account for approximately 30 percent of
the GDP, with 70 percent of these coming from Armenians working in Russia.11
1.2: The 2003 Equity-for-Debt Deal
The stark condition of the Armenian economy underscores the serious flaws in
the Armenian government’s logic of making short-term concessions to Russia that
curtail Armenia’s long term economic freedom. These concessions have occurred for
several reasons, including the general lack of a foreign policy process, the consolidation
of power at the top of the Armenian government, submission to substantial Russian
pressure, and dismal domestic economic conditions. Since former president Robert
Kocharyan took office in an election marred by fraud in 1998, large concessions have
resulted in Russian dominance of the economy, placing Russian interests in control of
Armenia’s transportation, telecommunication, banking, mining, and energy sectors.
The first and most pointed example of Armenian concessions in response to
Russian pressure is the 2003 Equity-for-Debt deal. Russia has implemented the
strategy of buying another nation’s debt to Russia in exchange for Russian ownership in
9

Ibid.
"Armenia | Data." Data | The World Bank. Web. 29 Nov. 2010. <http://data.worldbank.org/country/armenia>.
11
“Volume of Individual Remittances to Armenia from Russia and other Countries this Year to Reduce by 30%.”
ArmBanks.am/en. 11 Nov. 2009. Web. 09 Nov. 2010. http://www.armbanks.am/en/2009/11/11/3668/.
10
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that nation’s key enterprises since the early 2000s. In addition to applying this tactic to
Armenia, Russia has also brokered similar deals in Central Asia, with to applying this
tactic to Armenia, Russia has also brokered similar deals in Central Asia, with countries
such as Tajikistan and Kyrgyzstan, in order to gain key regional energy assets.12 In
Armenia’s case, however, the debt owed by Armenia totaled only 93 million dollars. This
is a relatively small amount by international standards, especially considering that US
aid to Armenia totaled over $1.6 billion from 1992-2005 alone.13
In 2003, the Russian government demanded repayment of this debt. When the
Armenian government did not immediately pay, it instead handed over five major
Armenian assets to Russia. With no foreign policy process to speak of, the decision to
do so was made largely by Kocharyan and his Defense Minister Serzh Sargsyan
without communicating to other members of the government or Armenian citizens the
terms of the deal. Only after the exchange did Armenians begin to protest explicitly
handing over essentials of the Armenian state to Russia. Additionally, Kocharyan and
Sargsyan were criticized for not even attempting to renegotiate the loan payments or
find other alternatives. Other countries, such as Georgia and Ukraine, also had acquired
national debts to Russia that totaled in the hundreds of millions in the early 2000s.
Unlike Armenia, both Georgia and Ukraine negotiated a harder line with the Russians
and were able to reschedule their debt payments.14

12

Gleason, Gregory. “Russian Companies Propose Debt-Equality Swap in Central Asia.” The Eurasia Daily Monitor.
Volume: 1 Issue: 103. 11 Oct. 2004. Web. 09 Nov. 2010.
13
Mainville, By Michael. "Second-Largest Recipients of U.S. Aid, Armenians Fight To Get Ahead - August 9, 2005."
The New York Sun. 9 Aug. 2005. Web. 13 Sept. 2010. <http://www.nysun.com/foreign/second-largest-recipientsof-us-aid-armenians/18286/>.
14
Danielyan, Emily. “Russia Tightens Grip on Armenia with Debt Agreements.” Headlines I Eurasianet.org. 6 May
2003. Web. 09 Nov. 2010. http://www.eurasianet.org/departments/business/articles/eav050703.shtml.
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It is not surprising, however, that Kocharyan would attempt to drive a hard line
with the Russians. President Putin was the first foreign head of state to recognize
Kocharyan’s electoral victory in 1998 at a time when most Western countries were
lambasting him for the fraudulent, skewed, and at times, repressive manner in which the
elections were conducted. If a hard line with Russia was not an option, then Kocharyan
was also criticized for not exploring other options, such as repaying the loan with
smaller, low-interest loans borrowed from European countries which would serve as
much softer creditors than Russia. The Armenian government could have also borrowed
money from the Armenian Federal Reserve, which at the time totaled $450 million.15
Even though this option would have hurt Armenia’s credibility in trading and borrowing,
it is arguable that doing so would have been preferable to handing over its major energy
assets. Regardless, the time frame in which the deal was made and the staunch
advocacy of the deal by the Kocharyan and Sargsyan suggest that other alternatives
were not seriously considered.
The five major assets traded in the Equity-for-Debt deal include key energy,
research and development, and manufacturing facilities. To begin, Russia acquired
ownership of the Metzamor nuclear power plant, which supplies Armenia with about 40
percent of its domestic energy.16 Prior to this trade, the plant’s operations were
invariably dependent on Russia for providing it with nuclear fuel. In fact, the plant was
traded specifically to satisfy a 32 million dollar debt accrued from the purchase of this
fuel.
15

Danielyan, Emily. “Russia Tightens Grip on Armenia with Debt Agreements.” Headlines I Eurasianet.org. 6 May
2003. Web. 09 Nov. 2010. http://www.eurasianet.org/departments/business/articles/eav050703.shtml.
16
Socor, Vladimir. "Armenia's Energy Sector, Other Industrial Assets Passing Under Russia's Control." Institute for
Advanced Strategic and Political Studies. Institute for Advanced Strategic and Political Studies, 13 Nov. 2002. Web.
09 Nov. 2010. http://www.iasps.org/strategic/socor12.htm.
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The logical flaws of Kocharyan’s decision to trade Metzamor to repay a
minuscule debt are compounded when taking into account his willingness to turn a blind
eye towards the endemic corruption in the energy sector. According to one estimate,
over 50 million dollars a year are lost due to unhampered corruption and
mismanagement. For example, prior to the Equity-for-Debt deal, the Metzamor plant
could not account for 120 million dollars that it was supposed to have been repaid by
domestic power distributors.17 Had corruption in just the energy sector been curtailed by
the Kocharyan Administration, the government would not have found itself in such a
fiscal bind and would perhaps not have folded so willingly to Russian pressure. This,
however, was not the case. In fact, the endemic corruption within the Armenian society
and the incestuous relationship between government and business in Armenia point to
rife corruption within the Kocharyan Administration. If Kocharyan was receiving a cut of
embezzled money or if he was supported by those who were, he had a direct
disincentive to curb corruption.18
In addition to the Metzamor facility, the Russian state-owned Unified Energy
System (RAO UES) gained control of six of Armenia’s nine hydroelectric facilities.
These hydroelectric facilities account for about 33 percent of Armenian energy.19 Russia
also gained the Hrazdan thermoelectric plant, which remains the largest source of
thermoelectric energy in Armenia, as well as Mars electronic and robotics plant in
Yerevan, a research and development facility for both military and civilian production,
17

Socor, Vladimir. "Armenia's Energy Sector, Other Industrial Assets Passing Under Russia's Control." Institute for
Advanced Strategic and Political Studies. Institute for Advanced Strategic and Political Studies, 13 Nov. 2002. Web.
09 Nov. 2010. http://www.iasps.org/strategic/socor12.htm.
18
"Robert Kocharian." New Internationalist: First Stop for Global Justice. Web. 29 Nov. 2010.
<http://www.newint.org/columns/worldbeaters/2006/12/01/worldbeaters/>.
19
"Armenia: Metsamor Nuclear Power Plant." Nuclear Threat Initiative: Home Page. 6 Aug. 2003. Web. 29 Nov.
2010. <http://www.nti.org/db/nisprofs/armenia/powerrea.htm>.
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which was one of the first of its kind during the Soviet era. Lastly, ownership of the
largest cement factory in the Caucasus, located in Hrazdan, was transferred to Russia
in place of 10 million dollars of gas debt. This swap gave Russia control over the
manufacturing of a raw material essential to the Armenian construction industry. When
the deal was finalized, Russia was left in control of over 90 percent of the energy sector
and dominated key production industries.20
1.3: Russian Management of Armenian Assets
Although the questionable deal caused some dissent in Parliament, even among
those who were typically more pro-Russian, not all were so pessimistic about the trade.
In fact, many believed in Kocharyan’s argument that Russian control of these assets
would create high-paying jobs, increase productivity, and, with the whole of debt to
Russia off of its shoulders, strengthen the economy and increase prosperity in Armenia.
This unfounded trust in Russian capabilities stems from the prevailing notion that
Russia will act in Armenia’s best interest. Historical legacies, both real and reified,
between the two countries of Russian protection of the Armenian people undoubtedly
contribute heavily to this presupposition. Nevertheless, Russian control of Armenia’s
strategic assets has neither created high-paying jobs, nor substantially improved the
condition of the Armenian economy. This is most evidently seen in Russian stewardship
of the Mars electronics and robotics plant and of the Metzamor nuclear plant.
The Mars plant struggled to operate effectively during the years after Armenian
independence and operated below its full output capacity. Its mediocre performance
and failure to substantially produce was largely the result of mismanagement, a lack of

20

Peterson, Alexandros. “Russia May Score Final Coup in Energy Battle.” Atlantic Council. 15 Jul. 2009. Web. 09
Nov. 2010. http://www.acus.org/new_atlanticist/russia-may-score-final-coup-energy-battle.
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funding, and the shallowness of innovation due to the massive brain drain that occurred
during the 1990s. Nevertheless, there was a great potential for the actual facility to once
more become a flagship for research and development, especially in Armenia’s budding
information and communication technology sector. When it was made public that the
plant would fall under Russian control, there was good reason for those frustrated with
the its performance to believe that Russian management of the facility would increase
performance and productivity, transforming the plant into a modern enterprise capable
of employing hundreds of Armenians with advanced technical training. They were to be
disappointed. Seven years after its acquisition, the plant has created virtually no new
jobs and runs at a dismal ten percent of its total capacity.21
Russian management of Metzamor is distinctly more troubling than its
management of Mars. While Metzamor continues to supply Armenia with nearly half of
its electricity, the IAEA deemed it the most unstable and unsafe of nuclear plants
worldwide.22 Metzamor has a sporadic track record since its construction in the 1970s,
during the economic stagnation of the Brezhnev period. Construction in Armenia during
the 1970s was particularly shoddy, inadvertently resulting in the deaths of over 25,000
Armenians during the 1988 earthquake in Spitak. During the 6.9 quake, structures built
during the 1970s crumbled and collapsed on top of their poorly built foundations.
Meanwhile, structures built before the 1970s were largely left standing. Following the

21

Yeghisabet, Vorskanian. "No Specific Development Program for Armenian "Mars" Plant Available." Armenian
News for Diaspora. 6 Nov. 2005. Web. 29 Nov. 2010.
<http://www.armeniandiaspora.com/showthread.php?29781-No-Specific-Development-Program-for-ArmenianMars-Plant-Available>.
22
Alkhazashvili, M. "TBILISI: IAEA Chief Visits Armenian Nuclear Power Plant Metsamor." Armenian News for
Diaspora. 3 Aug. 2005. Web. 09 Nov. 2010. http://www.armeniandiaspora.com/showthread.php?33864-TBILISIIAEA-chief-visits-Armenian-nuclear-power-plant-Metsamor.
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earthquake, Metzamor was shut down indefinitely due to its structural and operational
instability.
However, economic desperation during the early 1990s necessitated the
reopening of the plant with Russian financial assistance. Since then, Metzamor has
closed and reopened multiple times for repairs. Following an IAEA inspection during the
late 1990s, Armenian officials agreed to permanently close the plant by 2004. After
management of the plant had been transferred to ROA UES, the date was pushed back
to 2008. Recently ROA UES once again delayed the date for cessation of activity until
2016.23
The decision taken by the Russians to continue operations of the most unstable
nuclear plant for another eight years presents a high risk to the Armenian people and
the Southern Caucasus in general. Strikingly, despite the risks involved, the Armenian
government has remained compliant with the delays, demonstrating yet again a
willingness to submit to Russian plans at the possible expense of Armenia’s future.
Another troubling matter regarding Metzamor is the storage and transportation of
nuclear waste. During the Soviet era, nuclear waste was transported by ground from
Armenia to Russia via Georgia. Since the dissolution of the Soviet Union, however,
Georgian officials deny having any contractual agreement with Russia regarding the
transit of dangerous nuclear material through its borders. Despite being accused of
transporting nuclear material through Georgia without permits, Russia claims, albeit
dubiously, that it no longer uses land routes to transport nuclear material to and from
Armenia and, instead, transports fuel across Georgia using Russian cargo planes.

23

Page, Jeremy. “Experts Fear Armenian Chernobyl.” The Times. 16 Nov. 2004. Web. 09 Nov. 2010.
http://www.timesonline.co.uk/tol/news/world/article1077078.ece.
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Georgian officials have likened this method to “flying around a potential nuclear
bomb.”24 While this is certainly an exaggerated position, it is clear that Russia is not
being forthcoming about the whereabouts and methods of transporting fuel and nuclear
waste to and from Armenia.
Perhaps at the behest of the Russian government to alleviate transit costs,
Armenian Minister of Energy Armen Movsisyan proposed a law that was passed by
Parliament in 2005 that allowed for the creation of a nuclear waste storage facility on
Armenian soil that would hold a certain amount of spent fuel for up to 50 years.
However, many in Armenia, including Richard Giragosian, director of the Armenian
Center for National and International Studies in Yerevan, are worried that the necessary
precautions are not being taken to build this storage facility. Possible corruption,
mishandling of funds, and lack of experience in building the facility could lead to cutting
corners and shoddy workmanship. If not properly constructed, Giragosian argues, there
is a high chance that the nuclear waste could seep through the foundation, into the soil
and, eventually, into one of Armenia’s few natural resources: its vast network of
aquifers. Because these aquifers weave throughout the Caucasus, contamination by
nuclear waste would be devastating not only to Armenia, but to the Caucasus and the
Middle East as well. Greater transparency on behalf of the Armenian government about
the storage facility and increased international involvement is necessary to assure
Armenia’s citizens and neighbors that it is not gambling with regional security in order to
solve problems in the short term.25

24

Alkhazashvili, M. "TBILISI: IAEA Chief Visits Armenian Nuclear Power Plant Metsamor." Armenian News for
Diaspora. 8 Mar. 2005. Web. 29 Nov. 2010. <http://www.armeniandiaspora.com/showthread.php?33864-TBILISIIAEA-chief-visits-Armenian-nuclear-power-plant-Metsamor>.
25
ACNIS Closed-Briefing with Ambassadors. 30 June, 2010. Yerevan.
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With regard to constructing a new nuclear power plant to replace Metzamor, the
Armenian government once again acted against its own interests in order to
demonstrate its willingness to cooperate with Russia. Although it received considerable
offers from France and Japan to build the new plant, the bidding process, in reality, was
a sham; the Armenian government never had any intent to grant the contract to a nonRussian company. While Russia will almost certainly build a reliable and profitable
nuclear power plant, its pricing was higher than those of Japan or France.26
Furthermore, while Armenia already claims close political, economic, and cultural ties to
Russia, it missed an important opportunity to expand its economic dealings with
countries outside of the former Soviet Bloc, an opportunity that would be in Armenia’s
long term interests.
1.4: Energy as a Means of Control
Russia’s acquisition of Metzamor, the Hrazdon plant, and several other key
energy assets fits into the widely discussed topic of Russia’s use of energy resources
as a foreign policy tool. In Armenia’s case, the acquisition of these assets was the result
of the government’s willingness to submissively concede to Russian pressure, although
the leverage applied by Russia did not overtly pertain to energy; instead, it seems that
individual pressure was applied specifically to Kocharyan and Sargsyan, who were
eager to comply without a protest. However, there are two specific examples of Russia
flexing its energy muscles as a means to force concessions from Armenian officials and
to further entrench its economic and political control in Armenia.
The first example of Russia’s use of energy as a foreign policy tool can be seen
in its dealings with Armenia during the construction of the Tabriz-Yersakh natural gas
26

ACNIS Closed-Briefing with Ambassadors. 30 June, 2010. Yerevan.
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pipeline. The pipeline runs for about 25 miles between the cities of Tabriz in Iran to
Yersakh in southern Armenia. Contracted in 2004, the planned diameter for the pipeline
was 1,420 millimeters, which would have been capable of transporting nearly double the
amount of Iranian natural gas needed to meet Armenia’s demands.27 In exchange for
the natural gas, Armenia would contractually export electricity to Iran for a period of 20
years.28 This pipeline was meant as a first step towards building an oil refinery on
Armenian territory, thereby relieving, albeit marginally, Armenian dependence on Russia
for energy resources. It seemed that the Armenian government was, in a rarely seen
moment, taking constructive, forward-looking steps towards securing Armenia’s future
interests.
Russia had no interest in entertaining the idea of an Armenia with decreased
dependence on Russian energy. The Tabriz-Yersakh pipeline represented not only a
loss in profits for the Russian state-owned gas companies, but potentially represented a
loss in its political and economic influence over Armenia. Moscow acted quickly. It
announced in 2006 that it would end the gas subsidies that had been in place since
Armenian independence, which cut the cost of gas imported from Russia to about onethird of the price that European countries pay. This tactic had been used against
Ukraine and Georgia in the years following the Color Revolutions to demonstrate
Russia’s ability to punish both nations for strengthening ties to NATO and the West.

27

Socor, Vladimir. "IRAN-ARMENIA GAS PIPELINE: FAR MORE THAN MEETS THE EYE." Iran-Armenia Gas Pipeline:
Far More than Meets the Eye. The Jamestown Foundation, 21 Mar. 2007. Web. 13 Sept. 2010.
<http://www.jamestown.org/single/?no_cache=1&tx_ttnews[tt_news]=32607
28
Socor, Vladimir. "IRAN-ARMENIA GAS PIPELINE: FAR MORE THAN MEETS THE EYE." Iran-Armenia Gas Pipeline:
Far More than Meets the Eye. The Jamestown Foundation, 21 Mar. 2007. Web. 13 Sept. 2010.
<http://www.jamestown.org/single/?no_cache=1&tx_ttnews[tt_news]=32607
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As a long-proclaimed strategic partner of Russia, however, the majority of
Armenians were outraged at the sudden price increase. The effects from ending heavily
subsidized oil from Russia rippled throughout the entire Armenian economy, increasing
prices and squeezing the already struggling Armenian consumer. Further frustrating the
Armenian government and people, Russia claimed that it had not acted in poor faith;
after all, Putin explained, Russia was simply normalizing oil prices to meet market
demand. Armenia, he made clear, would receive no special treatment.29
In a knee-jerk response to Russia’s economic pressure, the Armenian
government brashly brokered several deals with Russia that left the latter solely in
control of Armenia’s energy grid. In exchange for mild gas subsidies (the price of gas
still doubled from $54 per 1000 cubic meters of gas to $11030) to be continued from
2006 to 2009, the Armenian government allowed for the sale of the fifth and final power
bloc of the Hrazdon power plant, which was the only bloc that Russia did not receive
after the 2003 Equity-for-Debt deal. Gazprom, Russia’s state-owned gas company, also
gained control of the first section of the Tabriz-Yersakh pipeline, which runs between
the southernmost Armenian cities, Meghri and Kajaran, allowing it to regulate Armenian
access to Iranian gas. Moreover, the purchase of these assets resulted in the Gazprom
ownership of 92 percent of ArmRosGaz, the Armenian-owned gas company.31
After acquiring the majority share in ArmRosGaz, Gazprom quickly sabotaged
the possibility of an energy-independent Armenia in the future. Instead of the original
29

Demourian, Avet. “Price for Russian Gas Doubles in Armenia, Talks Continue.” AP Worldstream. 01 April. 2006.
Web. 09 Nov. 2010. http://www.armeniandiaspora.com/showthread.php?43573-Price-for-Russian-gas-doubles-inArmenia-talks-continue.
30
Ibid.
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1,420 millimeter diameter planned for the Tabriz-Yersakh pipeline, the diameter was
slashed to 250 millimeters. Much to the displeasure of the Iranians and Armenians in
opposition to the Kocharyan Administration, this move handedly decreased the future
strategic importance of the pipeline. Currently, it is only marginally utilized, with gas
being pumped from Iran to Armenia at less than 300 million cubic meters per day, or
less than half of Russia’s daily gas exports.32 The Armenian government diverts
criticism for underutilizing the pipeline by stating that it makes more fiscal sense to
purchase subsidized Russian gas. Subsidies, they explain, bolster the Armenian
economy by keeping costs of transportation and production down, thereby helping the
average Armenian.33
Indeed, these subsidies may offer short-term relief for the one in two Armenians
estimated to be living in poverty. In the long term, however, this relief has come at a
hefty cost for Armenia’s aspirations for a more balanced approach to energy
independence. Furthermore, the government’s concessions that allowed for the
purchase of energy assets key to its economic security were counterproductive at best
and crippling at worst.
While Russian subsidies may aid the Armenian economy at the moment,
continued reliance on these subsidies increases Russia’s economic and political control
of Armenia. Instead of folding to Russian pressure, the Armenian government should
have realized the strategic importance of the Tabriz-Yersakh pipeline, kept it under
Armenian control, and used it as a first step towards diversifying its energy resources.
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Likewise, the Kocharyan Administration should have realized that Moscow was
leveraging its control over Armenian energy in an attempt to bend Armenia’s will toward
its own. Having come to this realization, the government should then have done
everything it could to prevent the acquisition of the Tabriz-Yersakh pipeline, which gave
Russia full leverage over its energy sector. Lastly, it should have focused less on the
importance of keeping Russian subsidies and more on disbarring corruption and
creating economic incentives. Doing so could have lessened the need for gas subsidies
in the first place, diminishing Russia’s ability to leverage them against Armenia.
The second example of Russia using its energy resources to influence foreign
policy is seen in its role in encouraging normalization of relations between Turkey and
Armenia. In this case, Russia’s interests in the normalization of relations correlates with
Armenia’s interests; thus, current Russian pressure acts in Armenia’s favor, for now.
Unlike the Armenian government, the Turkish and Russian governments have economic
contingency plans in the event of Turkey reopening its border with Armenia. Russia and
Turkey have discussed and agreed upon the sale of RAO UES electricity from Armenia
to Eastern Turkey and the mass shipment of Turkish goods to Armenian markets using
preexisting railways. Because Russia has an economic incentive for the normalization
of relations, it has been instrumental in calling for a return of official diplomacy between
the two nations.
Russia also has great political interest in enticing Turkey towards Moscow and
away from NATO and the US. Slighted by the EU and disillusioned by NATO’s
international role after the US-led wars in Iraq and Afghanistan, Turkey is seeking to
reestablish itself as a leading global power. Its attempt to co-create a plan for the
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Iranian nuclear program with Brazil showed a willingness to deviate from Western
methods of dealing with Iran. Another significant deviation from the US and the West
occurred in the summer of 2010 when Turkey supported several attempts to break the
Israeli-enforced blockade of the Gaza Strip. Although historically a competitor with
Turkey for power in the Caucasus, Russia sees an important opportunity to exacerbate
tensions within NATO by warming relations with Ankara. By selling electricity to eastern
Turkey, Russia could also expand its ability to leverage its energy resources in a
country traditionally its rival.
Armenia, too, stands to gain economically from normalization of relations with
Turkey. Transportation costs would decrease, opening up markets for more competition.
Inexpensive Turkish goods would ease Armenian consumers’ stark budgets.
Interestingly enough, economists predict that Armenian GDP would not see an increase
in the short-term, were Turkey to open its border.34 This speaks to the poor
development of Armenian industry and the lack of preparedness of the Armenian
government for such an event. Nevertheless, in the long run, after a period of about 10
years, the Armenian GDP would see an increase as a direct result of trade with
Turkey.35
Instead of pursuing greater economic trade with the West, Armenia, it seems, is
bound to have further economic and military entanglements with Russia. As mentioned
previously, Russia is seen by the majority of Armenian people not only as a protector,
but also as a land of opportunity. Because Russia offers thousands of Armenians the
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chance of an improved life, because it is one of Armenia’s biggest trading partners, and
because the majority of remittances come from Russia, it is in Armenia’s interest for
Armenia to maintain high levels of economic interaction with Russia. However, it is also
in Armenia’s best interest to diversify its economy and deepen ties, at least
economically, with the EU and the US. Regardless of Armenia’s need to strengthen its
economic partnership with Europe or the US, Armenia received a 500 million dollar loan
from Russia as a result of the global economic crisis and its crippling effect on
Armenia’s service-based economy. The terms of this loan remain murky; however, it is
certain that Russian influence in the region will become further entrenched.36
The loan process in itself shows a disparity of relations between Russia and
Armenia, relative to other CIS countries. For example, the Armenian government
originally requested a loan package amounting to 1.2 billion dollars.37 Central Asian
nations such as Kyrgyzstan and Tajikistan also requested loans in the billions of dollars
from Russia. The discrepancy between the two requests is that the Central Asian
countries received near the full amount of assistance for which they asked, Armenia
received less than half. Taking into account Russia’s preference for equity-for-debt
deals, it could be that Russia is hoping to gain substantial energy resources in Central
Asia is countries like Kyrgyzstan default on their loans. It could be, then, that Russia did
not grant the full amount of assistance to Armenia because it is already in control of its
energy sector and is dominant in its transportation, banking, and telecommunications
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sector as well. Thus, if Armenia were to default on a billion dollar loan, Russia would
have few Armenian assets left to acquire.
That being said, it is troubling to think of what the Armenian government would
relinquish in the event that it defaulted on the 500 million dollar loan given the key
assets handed over to Russia to satisfy 93 million dollars of debt. Even more troubling is
the fact that almost no terms or conditions of the loan have been disclosed; in yet
another display of individualism trumping a foreign policy process, current president
Serzh Sargsyan negotiated the loan behind closed doors. All that is known is that the
Armenian government must repay the loan within fifteen years, with a four year grace
period. Very rarely does Russian assistance come without strings attached. Several
experts believe that the hazy terms of the loan include the inclusion of Armenia into a
ruble zone. Others believe that the terms of the loan will strengthen ties between
Russian and Armenian militaries, possibly even integrating the two.38 Although the
government has not commented specifically on what Armenia may concede to Russia,
Vartan Ayvazian, Chairmen of the Economics Committee, ominously confirmed that the
loan would “increase Russia’s political influence in Armenia.”39
CHAPTER 2: ARMENIAN-RUSSIAN SECURITY RELATIONS
2.1: Armenia and the Collective Security Treaty Organization
Armenian submissiveness, perpetuated by Armenians’ insecurities over the 1915
genocide perpetrated by the Ottoman Empire, has allowed for concessions that place
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Russia in a position of military dominance in security agreements. These agreements
underscore the inequality with which Russia interacts with Armenia, relative to the
former’s dealings with other CIS countries.
Unlike many of the former soviet republics, Armenia never severed security
cooperation with Russia in the years following its independence. In fact, Armenia was
one of the original signatories of the 1994 Collective Security Treaty (CST), along with
Russia, Kazakhstan, Uzbekistan, Kyrgyzstan, and Tajikistan. Formed shortly after the
dissolution of the Soviet Union, the short-lived CST encountered fundamental internal
problems. As strong nationalist feelings emerged within the former Soviet Union, many
newly-independent nations’ governments were hesitant entering into a military
agreement with Russia, believing Moscow’s aim to be consolidation of military control
over the region.40
Furthermore, many member states remained wary that the treaty acted solely to
protect Russian interest and territorial integrity. General distrust among member-states
and the widespread economic woes of shock therapy laid a shoddy foundation for the
security agreement. The CST was unable to prevent war between Armenia and
Azerbaijan over Nagorno-Karabagh War at a time when both were members of the
CST. Likewise, the CST failed to respond to political upheaval in Tajikistan that resulted
in the deaths of thousands and the displacement of hundreds of thousands. During both
of these events, the CST failed to mobilize a substantial collective response, proving
ineffective with dealing with the crises.

40

Weinstein, Adam. "Russian Phoenix: The Collective Security Treaty Organization." The Whitehead Journal of
Diplomacy and International Relations VIII.1 (2007): 167-80. Archived Issues. The Whitehead Journal of Diplomacy
and International Relations. Web. 28 Nov. 2010. <http://blogs.shu.edu/diplomacy/archived-issues/>.

24

The collapse of such a collective security treaty is predictable given its proximity
to the collapse of the Soviet Union and the strong nationalist feelings that arose within
the independent statehoods. John Mearsheimer, a contemporary scholar of neorealism,
argues that collective security institutions are plagued by pervasive undercurrents of
member-states’ narrow self-interest. This self-interest prevents the institution from
acting effectively and within its original purpose of hampering the threat of either internal
or external aggression against its members.41 Collective security, therefore, can be
seen as a convenient construct for bandwagoning, which occurs when smaller, weaker
states join larger, more powerful states to lessen the threat of an external entity or state.
For example, the Armenian government feared invasion by Turkey following the
collapse of the Soviet Union, and not unrightfully so. Indeed, in 1993 the Turkish
government strongly considered concrete plans for military aggression against a
weakened Armenia, which was tangled in the throes of the Nagorno-Karabagh War.
Because Armenia retained strong ties with Russia, however, it was able to leverage its
association with Moscow to stave off the threat of Turkish attack from the west while
focusing on defeating Azerbaijan in the east during the Nagorno-Karabagh War.
Deterring Turkish hostility was not in any part the result of the CST, but rather, a
matter of bilateral security agreements with Russia. Although Armenia is presently a
member of the revitalized Collective Security Treaty Organization (CSTO) which
includes Belarus, Russia, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Tajikistan, and Uzbekistan, the flaws
in collective security treaty, as delineated by Mearsheimer still apply. Thus, in order to
evaluate inequalities and concessions within Armenian-Russian security relations, it is
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necessary to do so solely on a bilateral basis, rather than within a collective security
construct.
2.2: The Armenian-Russian Security Pact: 1995 -2010
Stemming from the 1915 genocide, Armenia’s sense of insecurity permeates its
foreign policy and security rationale, causing the Armenian government to make willful
concessions to the Russian in security arrangements. These concessions are based on
former realities that no longer exist nor pertain to Armenia. Not only do Armenia’s
submissive security agreements with Russia not fully guarantee Russian support in the
event of open hostilities with Azerbaijan, but they also curtail Armenia’s ability to act in
its own interest and expose the inequality inherent in Armenian-Russian relations.
The conditions surrounding the presence of a Russian military base in Gyumri,
Armenia’s second most populous city, best exemplify the consequences of the
Armenian government’s negotiating security arrangements from a position of insecurity.
Although Armenia achieved decisive victory over Azerbaijan resulting in the retention of
Nagorno-Karabagh, prolonged warfare and the severance of vital trade relations with
Turkey and Azerbaijan sharply deteriorated Armenia’s economy and military. The
fragility of the Armenian state and Turkey’s 1993 plan to invade Armenia’s western
borders amplified Armenian insecurities about the genocide and the magnified the
existential threat posed by Turkey. In 1995, the Armenian government petitioned the
Russian government to station Russian troops in Gyumri and along Armenia’s border
with Turkey and Iran. By August, Russia had approximately 4,300 troops, 80 tanks, and
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over 100 pieces of artillery in Armenia – a relatively small figure that proved to be mostly
symbolic of Russia’s guardianship.42
Given the precarious economic and military positioning of Armenia following the
Nagorno-Karabagh conflict, reinforcing its security ties with Russia made sound
strategic sense, especially in lieu of the probability of Turkish aggression. It was not the
principle of commissioning Russian bases in Armenia that constituted a concession on
behalf of the Armenian government, but rather, it was the financial specifics of the
agreement which exposed relational inequalities between the two “strategic partners:”
conditions of the agreement stipulated that Armenia would bear the financial
responsibility of hosting the Russian base, including covering basic but substantial costs
such as utilities and upkeep of the grounds.
During diplomatic discourse regarding the presence of Russian troops stationed
in Armenia, Russia looked towards its own interest and took advantage of the weakness
and insecurity of the Armenian government. The Russian government sensed an
opportunity to expand its influence and reestablish a military presence in the Caucasus
at almost no cost to itself. Because protection from Turkey was Armenia’s biggest
security priority following the Nagorno-Karabagh War, the Armenian government was
willing to financially support Russian troops in exchange for national peace of mind.
Given Turkey’s intended belligerence just three years prior to the agreement, it
can be argued that the Armenian government was right to make this concession. The
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terms of the lease on the Gyumri base last for twenty-five years, necessitating its
renegotiation in 2020, at which point it was expected that the Armenian government
would adjust the lease’s terms of agreement to account for changes in the regional
political climate over the past twenty-five years. These adjustments may have included
demanding Russian financial responsibility over the base.43
In a move that shocked political opponents of Armenian President Serzh
Sargsyan, the lease on the Gyumri base was unexpectedly extended until 2044 in a
military pact signed by Armenia and Russia in August 2010. Both the situation
surrounding the signing of the agreement and its specifics once again reveal the
tendency of the Armenian government to complacently make concessions to Russia
without properly analyzing their long-term effects.
According to the conditions in the new military pact, the Russian government will
continue not to pay for the base’s upkeep and its utilities, despite the base’s growing
strategic significance to Russia. Conversely, the Armenian government will continue to
take on the full financial responsibilities of the base. This arrangement is highly unusual,
as global powers such as the US or Russia usually offer lucrative contracts to station
their troops on foreign soil.
For example, Russia maintains military bases in Kyrgyzstan, Tajikistan, and
Ukraine as well as radar stations in Kazakhstan, Belarus, and Azerbaijan. In addition to
fitting Russia with the bill for utilities, all of these countries receive compensation totaling
43
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in the hundreds of millions of dollars per year just for granting Russia the permit to
station troops within its territorial jurisdiction. Azerbaijan, for instance, receives $7
million a year for Russian control over the Soviet-era Qabala Radar Station which hosts
around 900 Russian soldiers.44 Likewise, the pro-Moscow Yanukovych Administration in
Ukraine controversially renewed its $98 million per-year contract to host Russia’s Black
Sea Naval Fleet, consisting of about 13,000 men and 42 ships.45 In comparison with
other former Soviet republics with which Russia has made security agreements,
Armenia is the clear loser.
The fact that the lease was extended ten years before consideration for such a
move was even necessary exposes two facets of Armenian-Russian relations. The first
is that Moscow applied pressure on the Sargsyan Administration in Yerevan to ensure
its strategic positioning in the Caucasus for the next half a century. Such actions by the
Medvedev Administration constitute major strides in accomplishing one of Russia’s
main foreign policy goals: the consolidation of Russian power in its traditional spheres of
influence. The extension of the lease of the Gyumri base until 2044 and the Ukrainian
Sevastopol port in the Black Sea until 2053 are the two most notable of such moves,
although Russia’s interest in securing vital energy sectors in Central Asia the Caucasus
also attest to the pursuit of such a policy.46
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Secondly, the early extension of the lease indicates that the priorities of the
Sargsyan Administration fall more closely in line with rapidly satisfying Russian
demands rather than weighing such demands within the context of Armenian interests.
Certainly, it is in Armenia’s interest to maintain strong security relations with Russia.
Likewise, prolonging the presence of Russian troops on Armenian soil may still serve a
strategic purpose; however, by rashly extending the lease on the Gyumri base,
Sargsyan displayed a disappointing deficit of analysis within his administration, resulting
in yet another missed opportunity for Armenia in the long run.
Sargsyan failed to account for current regional realities, such as Armenia’s
secure defensive posturing and clear military advantage in the Caucasus and the
unlikely threat of Turkish aggression As a result, Sargsyan entered Armenia into a
military agreement that ignores regional political developments over the past fifteen
years, solidifies Armenia’s position of inequality relative to Russia’s relations with other
members of CIS for the next three decades, and disservices the Armenian people by
perpetuating the pervasive notion of Armenian submissiveness to and dependence on
Russia.
2.3: Stipulations of and Reactions to the Pact
Concretely, the pact offers nothing new to Armenia besides reassurances of
Russian protection, including equipping the Armenian military with “modern compatible
weaponry and special military hardware.”47 Nevertheless, in response to a barrage of
questions about the pact, Russian Defense Minister Sergei Lavrov admitted that the
47
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agreement brought “no real or functional change” to the Russian mission in Armenia.
Not only does the unequal security relationship between Armenia and Russia remain
the same, but as Richard Giragosian argues, the defense pact “offers Armenia little in
the way of any clear military advantage.”48
A security pact that offers no assurances of military advantages for Armenia is
unacceptable, especially considering the increasingly bellicose rhetoric from
Azerbaijan’s President Ilham Aliev. During the spring and summer of 2010, the
Nagorno-Karabagh Republic Defense Army (NKR) witnessed a sharp spike in
Azerbaijani violations of the Russian-brokered 1994 ceasefire. The most severe of the
violations consisted of several successful offensive probes past the front lines of the
NKR Defense Army guided by unmanned flying drones purchased from Israel. These
drones gave Azerbaijan a military advantage that it could previously not claim: the
Azerbaijani armed forces were now able to receive real-time updates on Armenian and
NKR forces’ positioning and movements.49 While the NKR Armed Forces still retain a
strong military advantage over Azerbaijani forces that will be discussed more in detail
later, the use of this new technology has resulted in the deaths of several Armenian
servicemen and an escalation of tension over the volatile Armenian exclave.
The ample record of Azerbaijani violations of the ceasefire demonstrates that
neither Armenia’s membership in the CSTO nor its “strategic partnership” with Russia
serve as an effective deterrent for Azerbaijani aggression. In signing the military accord
with Russia amidst ongoing Azerbaijani-initiated skirmishes, the Armenian government
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hoped to send a clear message to Azerbaijan that a military solution to NagornoKarabagh is not an option.50 However, on September 1st, 2010 just two weeks after the
signing of the pact and one day before President Medvedev’s diplomatic trip to Yerevan,
Azerbaijan launched yet another probe into NKR defensive lines resulting in the deaths
of three Armenian and two Azerbaijani soldiers.
The timing was not a coincidence; the attacks were in blatant defiance of and in
response to Armenia’s purported confidence in Russian military support. In response to
the military pact, Azeri Defense Ministry press agent, Eldar Sabiroglu, reacted
incredulously, stating that “protocol can neither stop nor curb the Azerbaijani army.”51
More importantly, the aggression demonstrated a confidence on behalf of the Aliev
regime that Russia would not interfere on Armenia’s behalf, were the conflict in
Nagorno-Karabagh to spill over into larger aggression against the Armenian state. This
confidence is not completely unfounded, given Russia’s tepid denouncements of the
attacks and the general lack of pressure placed on Azerbaijan. Additionally, the terms of
the military pact do not explicitly assure Russian intervention in the event of full-scale
war between Armenia and Azerbaijan.
Moreover, the sale of Russian S-300 surface-to-air missiles to Azerbaijan sends
mixed messages to the Armenian government about the sincerity of Russia’s security
50

Danielyan, Emil. "Moscow Pushes New Armenian-Azerbaijani Peace Deal." Eurasia Daily Monitor 7.203 (2010).
Moscow Pushes New Armenian-Azerbaijani Peace Deal. The Jamestown Foundation, 9 Nov. 2010. Web. 28 Nov.
2010.
<http://www.jamestown.org/single/?no_cache=1&tx_ttnews[swords]=8fd5893941d69d0be3f378576261ae3e&tx_
ttnews[any_of_the_words]=armenia%20mars&tx_ttnews[tt_news]=37151&tx_ttnews[backPid]=7&cHash=be63f7
aa19>.
51
"Azeri Defense Ministry Responds to Russian-Armenian Defense Pact | Asbarez Armenian News." Asbarez
Armenian News | Grassroots Media Bringing News & Views From Armenia, the Diaspora and Around the World. 27
Aug. 2010. Web. 29 Nov. 2010. <http://asbarez.com/84604/azeri-defense-ministry-responds-to-russian-armeniandefense-pact/>.

32

assurances. Although the timing for Azerbaijan’s reception of the missiles remains
unknown, the August 2010 deal would provide Azerbaijan with $300 million in defensive
missiles designed to destroy aircraft and other missiles.52 Russian Defense Minister
Sergei Lavrov brushed off Armenian outcry and feelings of betrayal by coolly stating that
these missiles are “defensive weapons designed to protect a territory from external
missiles.”53 However, at the 2008 Plenary Session of the Conference on Disarmament
in Geneva, Lavrov stated that, “[i]t is well known that there is inseparable relationship
between strategic offensive and defensive armaments, and it is impossible not to take
that fact into account in the future military planning.”54
This sort of blatant double standard undermines Russia’s credibility and should
have caused the Sargsyan Administration to approach the security agreement more
cautiously. At least, the Armenian government could have tried to leverage its position
as Russia’s only ally in the Caucasus by refusing to consider renewing the pact until it
had gained Russian assurances that the purchase would not take place. Despite the
controversy surrounding the arms deal, no such attempt was made by the Sargsyan
Administration. Considering that Armenia’s main security concern remains the
prevention of Azerbaijani designs to militarily retake Nagorno-Karabagh and other
surrounding territories currently controlled by Armenia, Russia’s non-committal
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posturing and actions contradictory to the idea of strategic partnership such substantial
sell of weapons to Azerbaijan raises questions about the actual utility of the military
pact. Additionally, the unilateral decision by Sargsyan to agree to a military pact that
ignores Armenia’s present military advantage in the Caucasus and its potential strategic
significance to Russia warrants harsh criticism for its paltry ineptness and the rapidity
with which the Armenian government is willing to satisfy Russian desires at the expense
of the Armenian people.
2.4: Leveraging Points: Armenia’s Military Superiority in the Caucasus
Had the agreement clearly delineated stipulations for Russian military
involvement in Armenia and had Russia not considered selling the S-300s to
Azerbaijan, the Armenian government’s acceptance of the pact as it currently stands
would have still constituted a concession. Currently, Armenia enjoys military dominance
over Georgia and Azerbaijan, making it the leading military power in the Caucasus. In
fact, the Nagorno-Karabagh Armed Forces have consistently been ranked as the most
militarily superior out of any other former Soviet Republic. As such, the Armenian
government should have realized Armenia’s own strategic importance to Russia and
renegotiated the conditions of the pact to match current realities, instead of relegating
Armenia to almost four more decades of bearing the financial burden of Russian military
presence, the terms of which were established in the desperation of the mid-1990s.
Regardless, by placing Russian interests over Armenian interests, Sargsyan’s
decision further perpetuated the concept of Armenian inferiority relative to Russia
instead of leveraging Armenia’s position of relative strength in the Caucasus. In order to
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demonstrate the ability of Armenia to leverage its strong military posturing in the
Caucasus, it is necessary to briefly address the balance of power within the Caucasus.
2.41: Georgia
Militarily, Georgia poses no threat to Armenia in the short to mid future.
Destroyed in the brief but destructive war between Russia and Georgia in August 2008,
Georgia’s military infrastructure remains largely in a state of disrepair. Furthermore, it is
now highly unlikely that Georgia will become a NATO member in the near to mid future;
concretely, this translates into fewer dollars of military and economic aid to Georgia.55
Acutely feeling the squeeze of the global economic crisis, the Georgian government has
neither funding nor the popular backing to divert already sparse funds to the vast project
of rebuilding its military.
In fact, the Georgian government was so desperate to immediately flush money
into the economy that it very nearly sold its segment of the North-South gas pipeline,
which transports Russian natural gas to Armenia via Georgia.56 The decreased funds
for military expansion, the stale row with the Russians about the breakaway regions of
Abkhazia and South Ossetia, and the overall decline in economic conditions ensure that
Georgia will not reclaim its place as the military leader in the Caucasus in the near
future.
2.42: Azerbaijan
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With President Aliev’s continuous threats to retake Nagorno-Karabagh by means
of military force and increasing violence on the front lines of the territories, Azerbaijan
poses by far the biggest threat to Armenian military dominance in the region. In terms of
manpower, the Azerbaijani military claims around 72,000 soldiers, outmanning Armenia
by almost half . Likewise, Azerbaijan possesses approximately 600 tanks to Armenia’s
100, and 200 fighter jets to Armenia’s 39.57
Even more troubling for the Armenian government is Azerbaijan’s sharp increase
in military spending from 2004 to 2009. In just six years, Azerbaijan has increased its
military spending fourteen-fold, from $175 million in 2004 to $2.46 billion in 2009.58
Unlike Armenia and Georgia, Azerbaijan’s economy was not as severely affected by the
economic crisis due mainly to its reliance on lucrative exports of Caspian oil and natural
gas to Europe, allowing it to freely pump more and more millions of dollars into its
military budget. For example, the Azerbaijani government announced in October 2010
that it would increase its defense spending up to $3.1 billion in 2011. Armenia’s total
budget for 2011, in comparison, is only $2.8 billion.59 The drastic speed at which
Azerbaijan is allocating funds towards its military seems to legitimize its threats of
retaking Nagorno-Karabagh militarily.
As evidenced by the November 2010 Astrakhan Summit in which Russia
brokered agreements between Armenia and Azerbaijan regarding the exchange of
prisoners of war, Moscow has become more active as of late in trying to increase
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diplomatic dialogue and push a peace agreement between Azerbaijan and Armenia
over Nagorno-Karabagh. However, Azerbaijan’s unhalted aggression on the front lines
of Nagorno-Karabagh, the increased use of militant rhetoric from its leaders, and its
plans to expand its already-bloated military spending suggest that Azerbaijan does not
intend to resolve the conflict through diplomatic means. In light of this fact, it is
inappropriate for Russia to withhold security assurances from Armenia, a long-vetted
“strategic partner,” specifically pertaining to Azerbaijani aggression.
Regardless of Russia’s ambiguity towards its security obligations to Armenia,
Armenia is not in a position of military weakness relative to Azerbaijan. The billions of
dollars that Azerbaijan pumps into its military spending per year is misleading; much of
the money is wasted or lost due to the staggering levels of corruption within the
Azerbaijani government and military.
For example, in 2007 $30 million was allotted for an arms deal with Ukraine that
would provide Azerbaijan with premium artillery and tank rounds. Due to the rampant
corruption within the military, a large portion of the budget set aside to make this
purchase was pocketed by various Azerbaijani officials who used the leftover funds to
purchase large numbers of tank rounds that dated back to the 1950s from Belarus. This
almost 60 year old ammunition was mixed in with stockpiles of advanced, modern
ammunition in order to conceal the corruption. Indeed, the corruption went unnoticed
until an antiquated round backfired in an Azerbaijani T-55 tank during training exercises,
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killing all four personnel inside. Recurring incidents like this contribute to the pervasive
low morale of Azerbaijani soldiers.60
Ubiquitous low morale within the Azerbaijani army is also caused by exceedingly
poor living conditions, especially for those on the front lines of the disputed territory.
Every year, there are cases of ill-equipped Azerbaijani servicemen freezing to death in
the regions harsh winters. Poorly equipped and devoid of effective leadership, there is a
high-rate of suicide, murder, and drug use among Azerbaijani enlisted soldiers, the
prevalence of which further exacerbates problems of low morale.61
More central to Azerbaijan’s military woes is the desperate need for reform of the
actual military institution. Heydar Aliev, former Azerbaijani President and father to
current President Ilham Aliev feared usurpation of his power by military coup following
Azerbaijan’s independence from the Soviet Union in 1991. As such, he purposefully
neutralized the strength of the Azerbaijani army in order to dispense of the greatest
threat to his consolidation of power. Upon transferring power to his son in 2003 in
grossly fraudulent elections, Heydar Aliev imparted to Ilham Aliev the need to keep
Azerbaijan’s military strength marginalized.
For this reason, Ilham Aliev kept Safar Abiyev as Defense Minister, who is
known for his unequivocal loyalty to Aliev and his toleration of the endemic corruption of
the armed forces. The selection of Abiyev, who had served as Defense Minister since
1995 under Heydar Aliev, ensured the subservience of high-ranking military
commanders and the continuation of internal military weakness. As long as Aliev retains
60
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his paranoia of military coup and refuses to implement serious military reforms, the
Azerbaijani armed forces will remain in a state of weakness, regardless of the
acquisition of advanced technology or the ballooning of the defense budget.62
In light of the Azerbaijani’s army’s internal weakness, its endemic corruption, and
its prevalent morale issues, Russia’s sale of the S-300 missiles seems irrelevant from a
strategic perspective even if it does raise crucial questions about Russia’s military
commitment to Armenia’s security. Nevertheless, it is estimated that were Aliev to begin
implementing serious and impacting military reform, it would take only eight years for
Azerbaijan to be able to claim military dominance over Armenia and in the Caucasus.63
Eight years is a brief amount of time in terms of national security strategy and
preparation; however, a change in the regional balance of power possesses the
potential for negative, long-term implications for Armenia.
The failure of the Sargsyan Administration to sufficiently vocalize dissatisfaction
over the arms deal is indicative of the entrenched submissiveness to and reliance on
Russia, which has impinged the Armenian government’s overall ability to conduct
diplomacy in accordance with its own interests. The willingness of Sargsyan to agree to
the terms of an outdated military agreement with Russia that disadvantages Armenia in
the future while Russia simultaneously sold S-300 missiles to Azerbaijan underlines the
blatant and deplorable flaws in the logic of the Armenian government.
2.5: Leveraging Points: Turkey’s Emergence as a Global Power
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Claiming traditionally close cultural and historical ties, Azerbaijan and Turkey
have maintained fraternal relations following the former’s independence from the Soviet
Union. “One nation, two states” is a frequently-used phrase describing the intimacy of
their relationship. Although Russian pressure halted Turkey’s plan to interfere in the
Nagorno-Karabagh War in the early 1990s, Turkey has played an active role in ensuring
Azerbaijan’s security, including assuming military responsibility for the protection of the
Azerbaijani exclave, Nakhchivan. These traditionally close ties would seem to be a
cause for concern for Armenians, especially given Azerbaijan’s increasingly militant
posturing. As the actuality of Russian military action on Armenia’s behalf remains
obscure despite its professed security assurances for Armenia, the possibility of
aggression by both Azerbaijan and Turkey poses a threat to the survival of the
Armenian state.
However, as Turkey attempts to reemerge as a global power, it has begun to
distance itself from its traditionally close ties with Azerbaijan, causing a divergence from
the concept of “one nation, two states.” The harder Turkey pursues its goal of becoming
a world leader, the less likely Turkish aggression against Armenia becomes.
Turkey’s deal with Iran about the transfer of nuclear fuel, its involvement in the
Gaza flotilla, and its increased, unofficial diplomatic dealings with Armenia are just three
actions that signify changes in the status quo of Turkey’s foreign policy. Snubbed by the
EU after years of petitioning for membership, such assertive attempts to redefine
Turkish policy are attempts to redefine Turkey itself. The May 2010 deal between
Turkey, Brazil, and Iran, which involved the trade of Iranian low-enriched uranium (LEU)
for Turkish nuclear fuel, upset members of the international community, such as EU and
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the US, primarily because Turkey arranged the deal outside of international institutions
like the UN. Other such deals involving trading nuclear fuel for Iranian LEU had been
proposed through the UN; however, neither Turkey nor Brazil had played a role in these
trades which were ultimately rejected by Iran.64 Turkey’s desire to involve itself on the
forefront of a main international issue by diverging from the approaches of the world
leaders like China, the US, the EU and Russia highlights a reemergence in Turkish
confidence that coincides with Turkey’s rising international status.
Turkey’s newly found assertiveness in the international community once again
resurfaced in the summer of 2010 during the Israeli blockade of Gaza. Despite Turkey’s
membership in NATO and Israel’s intimate security relations with the United States,
Turkey acted as a home base for the Gaza Freedom Flotilla, the goal of which is to “to
raise international awareness about the prison-like closure of the Gaza Strip and
pressure the international community to review its sanctions policy and end its support
for continued Israeli occupation.”65 After Israeli commandos boarded the boats which
were ladened with humanitarian supplies, they were met with resistance and reacted
with excessive force, killing eight Turks and one Turkish-American. Although this
resulted in the straining of typically strong Turkish-Israeli relations, the drive to act
assertively and to do so without the permission of the international community once
again revealed Turkey’s desire to be recognized as a leading power.
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A result of Turkey’s shifting international positioning has been a warming of
relations with Armenia, at least relative to the frigid and tense relations of the 1990s. As
such, Turkey has made a public and private effort to begin normalization of relations
with Armenia. In September 2010, the Turkish government announced that it would
allow Armenians to worship in an Armenian church that had decayed over one hundred
years of neglect. As a gesture of goodwill, the Turkish government contracted the
renovation of the church and plans to do the same with other Armenian churches within
Turkey. 66
Privately, the Turkish government and various elements of civil society have
been meeting with their Armenian counterparts in the spirit of keeping an undercurrent
of diplomacy alive. For example, a group of ten Turks and ten Armenians, each drawing
from governmental ministries, national think tanks, and civil society groups, met for a
week in the Italian village of Laglio in August 2010 to discuss factors involved in
normalizing relations, including configurations on opening the border. Likewise, a group
of about fifteen Turkish journalists, including Hande Kolçak Köstendil, a CNN Turk
correspondent, visited Yerevan in June 2010 as part of a cultural exchange program
that is designed to mental borders between the two nations before the physical borders
are opened.67 Although Turkey does not recognize the genocide, the group
astoundingly visited the Tsitsernakaberd, the genocide memorial in Yerevan.
These sorts of cultural visits, something that was unthinkable even ten years ago,
are becoming increasingly common. The fact that secret diplomacy and cultural
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exchanges are being conducted is important to note, as it shows that both Armenia and
Turkey, in direct contrast to the belligerency of Azerbaijan, are taking small but serious
steps towards restoring diplomacy. Not only do these steps decrease the possibility of
Turkish aggression in the future, but they also diverge from the rigid, uncompromising
posturing of Azerbaijan, discrediting its viability as a means of resolving its disputes with
Armenia.
Armenia’s current military dominance in the Caucasus and the decreased threat
of Turkish aggression present a vastly different geopolitical reality than when it made its
security agreements with Russia during the mid-1990s. In the short term, Armenia holds
strategic economic significance to Russia, as a reestablishment of relations between
Turkey and Armenia would present an opportunity for Russia to export its energy
resources to Turkey via Armenia. In the long term, the plausibility of a powerful, reemergent Turkey underscores the strategic importance to Russia for keeping a military
presence in Armenia, as the two have historically vied for power and influence in
Eurasia. Russia would also be wise to recognize Armenia’s role as its only ally in the
Caucasus.
All of these factors lead should have been taken into account by the Armenian
government and used as leverage in order to gain a more favorable security agreement
with the Russians. Instead, the Sargsyan Administration, in a magnificent display of
submissiveness, sold Armenia’s future short by failing to push even for a normalization
of security relations with Russia, much less desperately-needed economic
compensation. Unlike the economic concessions that the Armenian government made
in order to pay off its debt, Sargsyan seems to have gained nothing in return from this
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security concession, except perhaps personal peace of mind stemming from the fact
that he satisfied Russia’s wishes, thereby remaining in favor with Moscow.
CONCLUSION
The Armenian government’s dealings with Russia since the inauguration of the
Kocharyan Administration have veered away from the policy of complementarism, which
was enacted by the Ter-Petrossian Administration following Armenia’s independence in
1991. Instead of making policy decisions based on Armenia’s best interests, the
Armenian government has adhered to a policy of submissiveness to Russia, which has
led to the brokering of bad deals with Russia, in which Armenian concessions for shortterm gain result in negative repercussions for Armenia in the future. As demonstrated,
Armenia’s economic and security relations with Russia sharply highlight these
submissive trends in Armenian policy. Specifically, these concessions have resulted in
Russian dominance of Armenia’s economy, particularly within the energy sector,
Armenia’s unhealthy economic reliance on Russia, and the perpetuation of Armenian
inequality within security agreements. In order to effectively better the lives of the
Armenian people, to assertively promote Armenian interests in the international realm,
and to bolster its latitude in making wise policy decisions, the Armenian government
must return to a foreign policy of balanced complementarism and it must do so while it
still has the opportunity to leverage its strengths.
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